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WHEN IS A CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
"SUBSTANTIALLY UNFIT TO SERVE"?
JAYNE W. BARNARD*
The recently enacted Securities Enforcement Remedies and
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 provides that, in an SEC en-
forcement action, a federal court may enjoin or "disbar" the de-
fendant from serving in the future as an officer or director of a
public company. A court may enter such an order if it finds that
the defendant is "substantially unfit" to serve as a corporate ex-
ecutive; the Act, however, does not define "'substantial unfitness. "
In this Article Professor Jayne Barnard provides a framework for
defining this term and identifying the defendants to which the
Remedies Act should apply.
Professor Barnard begins by looking at the legislative his-
tory of the Act, but finds little guidance there. She then exam-
ines three lines of non-Act cases in which courts have addressed
questions closely related to the question of executive unfitness.
She rejects these models as well as a fourth, which derives from a
British statute similar to the Act. Looking at the standards for
imposition of other types of injunctions under the securities laws,
and taking into account current criminological knowledge con-
cerning white-collar recidivism, Professor Barnard concludes by
establishing a seven-factor test to define "'substantial unfitness"
under the Act.
In October 1990 President Bush signed into law the Securities En-
forcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (Remedies
Act).1 The Remedies Act provides that, in an enforcement action by the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), upon finding
that a defendant has violated either section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act
of 19332 or section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 a fed-
eral court may, in addition to ordering monetary sanctions or injunctive
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William
& Mary. B.S., 1970, University of Illinois; J.D., 1975, University of Chicago. My thanks go to
Cliff Corker, Joe English, Mike DeBaecke, and Lisa Nicholson, all members of the William &
Mary Law School Class of 1993, and to Paul Marcus, Mike Gottfredson, Stanton Wheeler,
David Weisburd, Henry Pontell, Susan Grover, and John Tucker, for sharing their ideas with
me.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.S.).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1988).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
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relief, enter an order temporarily suspending or permanently barring the
defendant from serving as an officer or director of any public company.
This extraordinary executive disqualification provision codifies the long-
standing SEC practice of seeking such orders even in the absence of stat-
utory authorization.4 With the Remedies Act now in place, executive
suspension or bar orders (Remedies Act orders) are unquestionably legit-
imate remedies, at least when the requirements of the Act are satisfied.
What is unclear, however, is what those requirements may-or should-
include.
The statutory standard courts are to apply in determining whether
to enter a Remedies Act order is whether the SEC has shown that the
defendant is "substantial[ly] unfit[ ] to serve as [a corporate] officer or
director."5 The Remedies Act does not define "substantial unfitness,"
and the legislative history of the Act provides little guidance as to what
Congress may have intended by the phrase.6 Moreover, SEC enforce-
ment officials have been reluctant to speculate on how they are likely to
interpret this standard7 and only recently have begun to explore its appli-
cation.8 Thus, corporate executives are understandably uncertain about
4. See Jayne W. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Disen-
franchising Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 32, 38-41
(1989).
5. The section reads in full:
In any proceeding [under the applicable enabling subsection] the court may pro-
hibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as
it shall determine, any person who violated [the applicable penal provision] from
acting as an officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered
pursuant to section [12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to
file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of such Act] if the person's conduct demon-
strates substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer.
15 U.S.C.S. § 77t(e) (Law. Co-op. 1991); see id § 78u(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
6. See infra text accompanying note 28.
7. See, eg., Focus: Courts' Power to Bar Service as Officer or Director, No Longer Contro-
versial, Still May Raise Difficult Issues, BNA CORP. CouNs. WKLY., Nov. 21, 1990, at 7, 8
(reporting that Bruce A. Hiler, Associate Director, SEC Enforcement Division, refuses to pre-
dict the kinds of cases in which the staff will seek suspension and bar orders but cautions that
"there will be appropriate cases").
8. The SEC first announced its intention to seek a bar order under the Remedies Act in
March 1991. See David D. Stems, Litig. Release No. 12,802, 1991 SEC LEXIS 502, at *3,
1991 WL 296465 (S.E.C.) at *4 (Mar. 11, 1991) (announcing lawsuit against defendant Stems
and others, seeking "the maximum penalties available pursuant to the Securities Enforcement
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 and a bar against serving as an officer or
director of any publicly-held company"). Since then, the SEC has announced its intention to
seek bar orders in several other cases. See Charles Keating III, Litig. Release No. 13,118, [6
Topical Law] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 73,813, at 63,026, 63,029 (Dec. 12, 1991); Robert D.
Sparrow, Litig. Release No. 13,011, [1987-1991 Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Releases
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) t 73,792, at 63,379-14, 63,379-14 (Sept. 30, 1991);
John R. Ward, Litig. Release No. 12,993, [1987-1991 Accounting & Auditing Enforcement
1490 [Vol. 70
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what "substantial unfitness" means, or should mean, especially in a soci-
ety that until now has assumed that questions of executive fitness are
exclusively in the domain of the market.
Typically, executives assembling a management team take into ac-
count subjective factors, including a candidate's general and specific busi-
ness expertise, her ability to complement other available management
skills, compatibility with the organizational culture, and often such inde-
finable characteristics as "synergy" and "sizzle." The choices required in
selecting top-level managers are usually complex9 and always idiosyn-
cratic to a given organization. 10
The task of executive selection is complicated by its inevitable un-
certainties. A particular candidate's "fitness to serve" may not always be
evident. For example, personal rectitude and proven leadership skills in
a nonbusiness context are not always useful predictors of managerial suc-
cess.11 By the same token, significant character flaws and even prior un-
lawful conduct do not always signal an inability to lead effectively. 12
Given these uncertainties, one could fairly argue that, like other matters
Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,788, at 63,379-8, 63,379-8 to 63,379-9
(Sept. 26, 1991). The Commission already has settled two cases under the new provision. See
Robert Levin, Litig. Release No. 13,180, 1992 SEC LEXIS 596, at *2, 1992 WL 45945
(S.E.C.) at *1-*2 (Mar. 3, 1992) (prohibiting defendant from serving as officer or director of
any public company for 10 years); Delta Rental Sys., Inc., Litig. Release No. 13,073, [6 Topi-
cal Law] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH1) % 73,805, at 63,014, 63,014 (Oct. 29, 1991) (permanently
enjoining defendant CEO from acting as an officer or director of any public company).
9. The SEC has long recognized the complexity involved in selecting corporate execu-
tives. In In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964), the late Commission Chairman William
Cary conceded that "[m]anagerial talent consists of personal attributes, essentially subjective
in nature, that frequently defy meaningful analysis .... The integrity of management-its
willingness to place its duty to public shareholders over personal interest-is an equally elusive
factor." Id. at 170.
10. See CHARLES ANDERSON & ROBERT ANTHONY, THE NEW CORPORATE DIREC-
TORS-INSIGHTS FOR BOARD MEMBERS AND EXECUTIVES 89 (1986) (noting that regional
banks, for example, require very different directoral skills from those required by defense con-
tractors or fashion retailers).
11. See, eg., JAMES RESTON, JR., THE LONE STAR: THE LIFE OF JOHN CONNALLY 588-
610 (1989) (describing the financial collapse of the business empire of John Connally, former
Governor of Texas and Secretary of the Treasury); Dean Foust et al., Al Haig: Embattled in
the Boardroom, Bus. WK., June 17, 1991, at 108, 108 (noting that former Secretary of State's
international reputation and expertise did not save two companies on whose boards he served
from seeking protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code); Kevin Kelly, The Educa-
tion of Bobby Inman, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1989, at 50, 50 (reporting that former Navy admiral
and deputy director of the CIA failed as CEO of defense contractor Tracor, Inc.).
12. A number of business executives have led strong companies and created new share-
holder wealth after an initial run-in with the law. See Dyan Machan & Graham Button, Be-
yond the Slammer, FORBES, Nov. 26, 1990, at 284, 284-86 (recounting the comebacks of
Albert Nipon (jailed for income tax evasion), Peter Brant (convicted of insider trading), David
Begelman (convicted of embezzlement), and Paul Thayer (convicted of insider trading)). For a
broader discussion of the relationship between character and leadership, see THOMAS REEVES,
1992] 1491
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of business judgment, determining whether a candidate is fit to serve as a
high-level corporate manager is a task singularly unsuited to federal
court judges. 13 Indeed, executive selection involves the sort of risk-based
analyses that courts typically try to avoid.14 Yet, with the enactment of
the Remedies Act, Congress has indicated (1) that substantial unfitness
(and therefore presumably its converse, "substantial fitness") for high
corporate office must be capable of objective definition and (2) that fed-
eral courts are appropriate participants in the crafting of that definition.
Because the federal courts will inevitably have to undertake this task
and apply the Remedies Act to defendants appearing before them, it is
time to consider how judges might approach the substantial-unfitness
question. There are several possible starting points. Judges often must
measure the fitness of corporate executives in contexts not involving the
Remedies Act: cases involving removal from corporate office for cause,'-
cases involving omissions from proxy statements of material information
bearing on managerial competence and integrity,16 and cases involving
professional disqualification. 17 This Article explores the advantages-
and shortcomings--of the methods the courts have used in these situa-
tions to conduct the substantial-unfitness inquiry. It then examines the
experience of litigants under a statute with language and purposes similar
to the Remedies Act-the British Company Directors Disqualification
Act of 19861--to see if it may provide additional direction. The Article
concludes that none of these models offers sufficient guidance for deter-
mining whether and when an American executive is substantially unfit to
hold high corporate office. It then proposes a seven-part test to aid fed-
eral courts in making that determination. The test requires a court to
examine (1) the magnitude, or "egregiousness," of the underlying viola-
tion; (2) the defendant's previous violations of the securities laws, if any,
A QUESTION OF CHARACTER: A LIFE OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 413-21 (1991) (assessing the
effect of Kennedy's personal values on his ability to lead the country).
13. See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Atten-
tion: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1482, 1483, 1491 (1984) (noting that business
decisionmaking seldom involves the type of linear thinking familiar to lawyers and judges).
14. See, e.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUnES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 6-7 & nn.20-22 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining
that corporate executives have specialized expertise, which judges do not share, in dealing with
business risks); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (plural-
ity opinion) ("'[C]ourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.'" (quoting
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978))).
15. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
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and any other breaches of fiduciary duty as a corporate officer or direc-
tor; (3) the role of the defendant in the underlying securities-law viola-
tion; (4) the degree of the defendant's scienter in connection with the
violation; (5) the defendant's personal gain, if any, from the underlying
violation; (6) the likelihood of renewed misconduct; and (7) the defend-
ant's appreciation of the duties of a corporate executive.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE REMEDIES ACT
The Remedies Act traces its origins to the 1987 report of the Na-
tional Commission on Fraudulent Reporting (Treadway Commission),19
which recommended, among many other items, that "the SEC... seek
(congressional] authority to bar or suspend corporate officers and direc-
tors involved in fraudulent financial reporting from future service in that
capacity in a public company."2 Following this recommendation, the
SEC initiated discussions with congressional officials early in 1988.
In February 1989 Representative John Dingell introduced the Se-
curities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989,21 which sought to im-
plement the Treadway Commission's recommendations. The proposed
statute authorized federal courts to impose executive suspension and bar
orders on defendants found to have violated any provision of the federal
securities laws. 2 It also authorized the SEC to enter executive suspen-
sion and bar orders in administrative proceedings brought under section
15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act.23
As originally introduced, the Remedies Act contained no standard
by which courts were to determine whether to impose an executive sus-
pension or bar order.24 This omission, and other problems with the bill,
led the American Bar Association (ABA), through its Section on Busi-
ness Law, to oppose passage of the bill.2" After Richard Breeden became
19. James Treadway, Jr., a former commissioner of the SEC, chaired the commission. See
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1
(1987).
20. Id. at 66. Seven years earlier, criminologists Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager had
recommended more generally that "[m]anagement officials convicted of criminally violating
corporate responsibilities be prohibited from assuming similar management positions within
the corporation or in another corporation for a three-year period." MARSHALL B. CLINARD &
PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 318 (1980).
21. H.R. 975, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
22. Id. §§ 101, 202.
23. Id. § 201.
24. See Barnard, supra note 4, at 60.
25. See Securities Laws Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 975, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 127-32 (1989) [hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of attorney Richard Phillips); Let-
ter from Jean Allard, Section Chair, American Bar Association Section on Business Law, to
19921 1493
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SEC chairman in October 1989, the Commission proposed amendments
to the original bill that were designed to address some of the critics' con-
cerns. The amended bill narrowed the suspension and bar provisions by
deleting the SEC's authority to impose executive suspension or bar or-
ders on its own and by limiting the bill's application in litigated matters
to instances of "scienter-based fraud."26 The Commission's proposed
amendments, however, made no mention of "substantial unfitness" or
any other standard for federal courts to rely on in determining when to
impose a suspension or bar order.
After hearing arguments from the ABA and others that the SEC
should have to show at least some nexus between the defendant's imme-
diate misconduct and the need for a suspension or bar order, and that
some kind of unfitness standard was necessary to ensure fairness in the
application of the Remedies Act,27 both the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce added a "substantial unfitness" provision to the bill dur-
ing markup.28 But the committees never discussed in recorded session
the meaning of substantial unfitness.
The policy behind the Remedies Act is simple: barring a defendant
from future service as a corporate officer or director is an expeditious
mechanism, short of incarceration, for removing him from the tempta-
tion and the likelihood of renewed misconduct.29 Like other forms of
professional disqualification, Remedies Act orders serve the remedial
goal of incapacitation. Incapacitation is thought to be a highly effective
means of controlling business-centered misconduct.
30
The suspension and bar provisions of the Remedies Act serve other
remedial goals as well. A Remedies Act order functions not only as a
the Hon. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 11-24 (May 18, 1990) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
26. The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S. 647,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Richard C.
Breeden). The SEC's revised version of S. 647 was submitted to the Senate on February 9,
1990.
27. See Barnard, supra note 4, at 60-61; Letter from Jean Allard, supra note 25, at 69-71.
28. See S. REP. No. 337, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 616, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1395-96.
29. As I have noted before, one of the advantages of the Remedies Act over criminal
prosecution is that in criminal cases the SEC must cede authority to the Department of Justice.
In civil cases, such as those to which the Remedies Act applies, prosecutorial discretion re-
mains with the Commission. Barnard, supra note 4, at 77. Another obvious attraction is the
lower burden of proof required to prove wrongdoing.
30. John Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control,
28 CRIME & DELINQ. 292, 305-08 (1982).
1494 [Vol. 70
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specific deterrent to the defendant, but also as a general deterrent to
others within her organization and in the business community."1 Be-
cause it impairs the defendant's future employment opportunities, it
serves as a monetary penalty, even for those defendants who, for
whatever reasons, have no present ability to pay a substantial fine. 2 "It
also presents a means of extracting a fine in those instances where corpo-
rate indemnification would reimburse executives for judicially-imposed
fines."
33
II. SOURCES OF STANDARDS FOR EXECUTIVE UNFITNESS
Courts have often faced issues similar to those raised by the substan-
tial-unfitness provision of the Remedies Act. In each of the following
four scenarios, courts have been asked to consider-either explicitly or
implicitly-whether the defendant's conduct rendered him unfit to serve
in a significant position of trust and confidence.
A. The Removal-from-Office-for-Cause Cases
In the comparatively rare lawsuits in which corporate officers or di-
rectors have challenged their removal from office,34 courts have entered
implicit findings of unfitness to serve when corporations have presented
evidence of the executives' malfeasance or misconduct in office, inflexible
discord on major policy issues, disobedience of board directives, harass-
ment and uncooperativeness in the transaction of corporate business,
misapplication of funds, neglect, or incompetence.35 Other grounds for
31. Martin F. McDermott, Comment, Occupational Disqualification of Corporate Execu-
tives: An Innovative Condition of Probation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 616-17
(1982).
32. Id. at 616.
33. Id.
34. High-level corporate managers are typically terminable at will, subject only to the
liquidated-damages provisions of their contracts. See Julia F. Siler, Bob Schoellhorn Is Refus-
ing to Go Quietly, Bus. WK., Mar. 26, 1990, at 34, 34 (recounting astonishment in the business
community when the long-time CEO of Abbott Laboratories sued Abbott's directors for mis-
conduct in connection with their decision to fire him).
35. E.g., NAACP of Houston Metro. Council v. NAACP, 460 F. Supp. 583, 586 (S.D.
Tex. 1978) (holding that board could remove local executive secretary who failed to develop
organization's membership, behaved in a "dictatorial" fashion, and was responsible for certain
"irregular financial transactions"); Central Alaska Broadcasting, Inc. v. Bracale, 637 P.2d 711,
713 (Alaska 1981) (holding that board could discharge station general manager who refused to
fire an employee at the board's direction); Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 216 Cal.
App. 2d 227, 232, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1963) (holding that board could remove chairman
who had mismanaged a major project); Ross v. 311 North Cent. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 130 Ill.
App. 2d 336, 343, 264 N.E.2d 406, 410 (1970) (holding that minority shareholders could re-
move officers who loaned corporate funds without adequate security to another corporation
they controlled, rather than paying a dividend); Morton v. E-Z Rake, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 609,
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removal, such as conduct disabling the corporation from receiving licen-
sure,3 6 entering into a competitive business,
7 or mental incapacitation,3 8
may also exist.
Of these, however, only certain grounds for removal, such as incom-
petence or physical or mental incapacitation, seem sufficient to support a
finding of unfitness to serve as an officer or director in any corporation.
Other grounds for removal, such as interpersonal discord or insubordina-
tion, are often firm-specific and therefore may not be conclusive on the
issue of substantial unfitness to serve in public companies marketwide.
Still other grounds for removal, such as neglect of duty or usurpa-
tion of corporate opportunity, may also be firm-specific and thus may not
be helpful in resolving the substantial-unfitness question. That is, a di-
rector's failure to attend meetings or contribute constructively to the
governance of a particular company where meetings have been hastily
scheduled or are geographically inconvenient may not indicate a likeli-
hood of negligence in other venues. Seizure by a director of a corporate
opportunity in a particular market sector may warrant removal from the
aggrieved company's board, not to mention the imposition of monetary
damages, but may not warrant disqualification from leadership opportu-
nities in other market sectors. This may be true especially when the de-
fendant's behavior has occurred in a nonpublic company, in which
controls are less formal and investors' expectations are less well-defined
than in public companies.39
612-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that board could discharge executive vice president who
failed to obey a direct order to pay certain claims); Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 147
Mont. 1, 12-13, 409 P.2d 813, 820 (1966) (holding that board could remove director who
threatened to sue shareholders and "walked out" of meetings called to permit him to explain
corporate plans); Grace v. Grace Inst., 19 N.Y.2d 307, 315, 226 N.E.2d 531, 534, 279
N.Y.S.2d 721, 726 (1967) (holding that board could remove one of its members who had
engaged in repeated and unsuccessful litigation against the corporation); John v. John, 153
Wis. 2d 343, 346, 450 N.W.2d 795, 798 (1989) (holding that officer/director may be removed
upon showing of "gross misconduct," "lying to the board of directors, . . . deception and
disobedience of the board of directors, waste, and mismanagement").
36. Cf. Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding
that shareholders could reasonably conclude that CEO who had been convicted of bribery in
the solicitation of cable franchises should be removed, lest other communities "have some
reticence in dealing with" the company or "be tempted by knowledge of the conviction to exert
extortionate pressures" on the company).
37. E.g., Eckhaus v. Ma, 635 F. Supp. 873, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that discharged
officer could be removed from the board for cause because he had undertaken employment
with corporation's competitor); Williams v. Queen Fisheries, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 691, 695, 469
P.2d 583, 586 (1970) (holding that board could remove president who misappropriated com-
pany's equipment and employees to run a competing business).
38. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 302 (West 1990); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.58(B)(1) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1991).
39. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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In short, given that most removal-from-office-for-cause cases arise
out of power struggles in closely held companies and also that they often
involve firm-specific conduct, these cases do not, standing alone, provide
adequate guidance for determining whether a defendant is substantially
unfit to serve as an officer or director of any public company. In other
words, behavior that would constitute grounds for removal from office
for cause may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, basis for entry of a
Remedies Act order.
B. The Proxy Nondisclosure Cases
Another possible source of authority in interpreting the substantial-
unfitness provision of the Remedies Act is the line of federal proxy regu-
lation cases in which directoral candidates and senior executives have
withheld from shareholders material information that might bear on
their competence and integrity and, by logical inference, their fitness to
serve.4° Courts in these cases have found the pendency of multiple law-
suits against directoral candidates,4" the existence of significant conflicts
of interest on the part of directoral candidates or their agents,42 and a
candidate's substantial criminal record43 all to be material on the issue of
40. See generally Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Disclosure of Information Bearing on Manage-
ment Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 555, 565-605 (1981) (describing case law).
Currently, proxy statements must include disclosure of certain "events" of the preceding five
years that are material to an evaluation of the competency or integrity of any director, direc-
tor-nominee, or executive officer. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f) (1991). These events include busi-
ness bankruptcies, criminal convictions, entry of orders enjoining participation in the financial-
services industry or other business practices, and adjudicated violations of the federal securities
laws. Id.
41. E.g., Fry v. Trump, 681 F. Supp. 252, 261 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that failure to
disclose 10 pending lawsuits stated a claim under SEC Rule 14a-9); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l
Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 661 (D. Del. 1980) (holding that failure to disclose prior consent decree
and pending lawsuits alleging securities fraud in connection with other corporations was a
material omission).
42. E.g., Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (holding that company should have disclosed that its investment banker had a clear
conflict of interest in connection with a pending transaction, inasmuch as it might have had
"an adverse affect (sic] upon the shareholders' decision on the integrity and fitness of the indi-
vidual defendants to hold office"); see also Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d 987, 991
(2d Cir. 1988) (holding that company's failure to disclose in a merger proxy statement that
director, a lawyer, had served for years as counsel to the other party's executives, was a mate-
rial omission).
43. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895,
914 (D. Del. 1973) (holding that, when the unsavory reputation of a directoral candidate was
likely to impede FCC approval of a transfer of control, failure to disclose a directoral candi-
date's history of bad check charges, a fugitive-from-justice warrant, and a conviction for drunk
driving was a material omission under Rule 14a-9).
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managerial competence and integrity.'
Typically, upon finding that the defendant has withheld information
of this sort, federal courts have required proxy resolicitation.45 The sug-
gestion is that had the undisclosed facts been disclosed at the outset vot-
ing shareholders might have voted "no" on the candidates because of
their unacceptable conduct, rather than voting "yes" or, as often occurs,
throwing their proxy ballots in the wastebasket.
The proxy nondisclosure cases, however, like the removal-from-of-
fice-for-cause cases, provide imperfect guidance for determining when an
executive is substantially unfit to serve as an executive in any public com-
pany. Just because an executive's prior conduct might be material to a
voting shareholder and thus properly discloseable in a proxy statement,
does not mean that it should be dispositive on the issue of executive fit-
ness. If that were the case, in every lawsuit in which material nondisclo-
sures in proxy statements were proved, federal courts would be
authorized to substitute their judgment for that of the shareholders and
either delete candidates' names from the proxies before solicitation or
remove already-elected directors from office. Obviously, this is not what
happens. Moreover, dozens of directoral candidates each year volunta-
rily disclose circumstances that one could construe as reflecting nega-
tively on their personal competence and integrity," but they are not for
that reason automatically disqualified from seeking corporate office.
There is, in addition, the question whether information that is ar-
guably material within the context of a single company or type of com-
pany also is material to shareholders of any public company. For
example, a directoral candidate's criminal past may be disqualifying
when it is likely to interfere with licensure,47 but may not be in an unreg-
44. Directoral candidates are not, however, required to "confess guilt" in proxy state-
ments to uncharged crimes. United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1986).
45. E.g., Gladwin v. Medfield Corp., 540 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming
trial court's order requiring resolicitation and a new election); Kaufman v. Cooper Cos., 719 F.
Supp. 174, 185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (voiding all proxies and rescheduling meeting).
46. See, eg., REGAL INT'L INC., PROXY SOLICITATION, Aug. 12, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at *11 (disclosing that director had been indicted on
money-laundering charges); FIRST CAPITAL CORP., PROXY SOLICITATION, Feb. 16, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at *7 (director had been convicted of failing to
file an expenditure report in his capacity as a public official, a misdemeanor under local law);
MCFADDIN VENTURES, INC., PROXY SOLICITATION, June 8, 1989, available in LEXIS, Fed-
sec Library, Proxy File, at *25 (director of merger partner had pled guilty to misdemeanor
contempt of court); GAF CORP., PROXY SOLICITATION, Jan. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at * 115 (vice chairman had been indicted for conspiracy, stock
price manipulation, securities fraud, and wire fraud).
47. E.g., Chris-Craft, 354 F. Supp. at 914 (holding that a criminal record was material
because it could result in revocation of company's FCC license).
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ulated industry. A directoral candidate's alleged misconduct within the
confines of a family-owned business or other nonpublic company may
not disqualify him (or suggest that he should be disqualified) from serv-
ing as an officer or director of a public company.48
In short, the proxy nondisclosure cases, while instructive on the
types of behavior that may evidence substantial unfitness, do not define
substantial unfitness. Courts would surely overreach were they to find
that any behavior required by the federal proxy regulations to be dis-
closed in a later-dated proxy statement provides sufficient grounds for
imposition of a Remedies Act order.
C. The Professional Disqualification Cases
Another possible source of authority on the question of substantial
unfitness is the line of professional disqualification cases involving law-
yers, physicians, and others. Typical professional licensure statutes pro-
vide for license revocation in cases of "illegal conduct," "habitually
negligent practice," "dishonorable conduct," or "fraudulent or dishonest
conduct."49 The body of less than entirely satisfying law that has devel-
oped around these statutes demonstrates the uncertainty that often ac-
companies their application. For example, professionals have
successfully challenged statutes permitting disqualification for "gross
negligence" and "misconduct" on the grounds that they are void for
vagueness.50 Other professionals, however, have lost when they argued
that such disqualifying standards as "unprofessional conduct,"51 "dis-
honorable conduct,"5" or "bad moral character"53 are unconstitutional.
All of these statutes, however, share a feature not present in the Reme-
dies Act: initial application in whole or in part by peer professionals who
are assumed to be knowledgeable about the customs and practices of
48. E.g., GAF Corp. v. Heyman, 724 F.2d 727, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[Behavior] in-
volving management of a public corporation should be considered more important to voting
stockholders than [behavior within a family business.]").
49. RANDOLPH P. REAVES, THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING AND CERTIFICA-
TION 208 (1984).
50. H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Board of Professional Eng'rs, 113 Idaho 646, 649-51, 747 P.2d
55, 58-60 (1987) (stating that "[d]isciplinary standards cannot be kept secret from the profes-
sionals or the courts" and that "[w]ithout clearly articulated standards as a backdrop against
which the court can review discipline, the judicial function is reduced to serving as a rubber
stamp for the [Disciplinary] Board's action").
51. Chastek v. Anderson, 83 Ill. 2d 502, 509, 416 N.E.2d 247, 251 (1981) (holding that
such terms are "susceptible to common understanding by members of the profession").
52. Duncan v. Missouri Bd. for Architects, 744 S.W.2d 524, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(citing State ex rel. Lentine v. State Bd. of Health, 334 Mo. 220, 234, 65 S.W.2d 943, 949
(1933); Holmes v. Missouri Dental Bd., 703 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
53. Id.
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their profession as well as the standards of conduct-often embodied in a
written code-to which members of their profession are to be held.
Other than generalized standards of care and loyalty,5 4 there are no
such agreed-upon standards of conduct for corporate officers and direc-
tors, nor any recognized peer-reviewing bodies to construe them. The
National Association of Corporate Directors, a voluntary membership
organization, does not "disqualify" from office those applicants who fail
to meet its membership standards. Neither does the Conference Board,
the Young Presidents' Organization, or the Business Roundtable.
Some professional disqualification statutes are straightforward in
describing the circumstances that give rise to disqualification. Often
states automatically disqualify professionals found guilty of a felony, for
example.-'- There are no such rules, however, for corporate executives.
Thus, we find corporate boards appointing and reappointing managers
who have been found guilty of tax evasion, 6 assault, drunk driving, and
other "personal" crimes,5 7 and even forgery and embezzlement from the
companies they serve in a fiduciary capacity.5" What differentiates these
executives from their (disqualified) professional brethren is not their
moral purity but their ability to generate value for their shareholders.
Federal disqualification statutes-even those administered by the
SEC-similarly fail to suggest a workable standard for determining when
corporate executives are substantially unfit. Registered brokers may
have their registrations suspended or revoked if they have "willfully vio-
lated" the securities laws and the suspension or revocation is "in the pub-
lic interest."5 9 In these cases, however, the SEC, not a federal court,
makes the initial decision to suspend or revoke the defendant's license.
Like state disciplinary panels for physicians and lawyers, the SEC is be-
lieved to have special expertise in reviewing claims of unfitness among
54. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1991).
55. E.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(4) (McKinney 1983) (providing for automatic disbarment
when an attorney is convicted of a felony).
56. See, eg., Phyllis Furman, Albert Nipon's in Basic Black Again-Dress Company Fash-
ions a Turnaround, C.AiN's N.Y. Bus., Nov. 14, 1988, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, NYBus File (reporting that CEO of Albert Nipon, Inc. returned to company after a 20-
month imprisonment).
57. See, e.g., PETER COLLIER & DAVID HORowITz, THE FORDS: AN AMERICAN EPIC
382 (1987) (recounting the well-publicized drunk driving arrest of Henry Ford II while he was
CEO of Ford Motor Co.).
58. See, eg., DAVID MCCLINTICK, INDECENT EXPOSURE: A TRUE STORY OF
HOLLYWOOD AND WALL STREET 311-25 (1982) (recounting the story of David Begelman,
who was reinstated as president of Columbia Pictures, Inc. following disclosure that he had
embezzled tens of thousands of dollars from the company).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1988). A similar standard applies to mutual fund managers
and investment advisers. See id. §§ 80a-9(b), 80b-3(e).
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financial professionals' and to appreciate the special "public interest"
needs present in the financial markets.6" No one would suggest that fed-
eral courts share this special expertise or indeed that anyone has special
expertise with respect to the issue of corporate executives' fitness to serve.
The inability to define managerial fitness with precision may explain in
part why so many boards have fired their CEOs in recent months62 or
why so many substantial and respectable public companies have found
themselves filing for protection under the bankruptcy statutes.
6 3
In short, the professional disqualification cases are of little direct use
in deciding who is substantially unfit to serve as a corporate officer or
director. Indeed, risk-prone behavior unsuited to a nonexecutive profes-
sional may be precisely the sort of behavior investors seek when their
company is facing new market challenges.
D. The Company Directors Disqualification Act
Another possible source of authority that appears at first glance to
be quite directly on point is a line of English cases decided under the
Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986, which permits courts
in the United Kingdom to suspend or bar corporate executives whom
they find to be "unfit to be concerned in the management of a com-
pany.5 64 Under a predecessor to this statute the late Robert Maxwell, as
60. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 598 (2d Cir. 1969).
61. The "public interest" standard has withstood challenges that it is void for vagueness,
in part because courts have found that the SEC is singularly well situated to determine what
the public interest requires. See Dirks v. SEC, 802 F.2d 1468, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
62. See Jim Bartimo & Karen Blumenthal, Compaq's Canion is Unexpected Casualty of
the Brutal Personal-Computer Wars, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at B1; Joann S. Lublin, More
Chief Executives Are Being Forced Out by Tougher Boards, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1991, at Al;
Amal K. Naj, Hennessy Is Retiring at Allied-Signal Ina, Sooner Than Expected, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 1991, at Al.
63. These companies include, for example, Greyhound, Eastern Airlines, TWA, South-
land Corp., Revco Drugs, Federated Department Stores, Allied Stores, Macy's, Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert, and Circle K. Amanda Bennett & Joann S. Lublin, Increasing Turnover at the
Top Sends Many Executives' Careers into Limbo, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1992, at B1.
64. 7(2) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 2113 (4th ed. Reissue 1988). The act in
full provides:
The court must make a disqualification order against a person in any case where, on
an application for this purpose, the court is satisfied (1) that he is or has been a
director of a company which has at any time become insolvent, whether while he was
a director or subsequently, and (2) that his conduct as a director of that company,
either taken alone or taken together with his conduct as a director of any other com-
pany or other companies, makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a
company.
The minimum period of disqualification which may be imposed under these pro-
visions is two years, and the maximum period which may be imposed is 15 years.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a result of the failure of his Pergamon Press, was found in 1971 to be "a
person who [cannot] be relied on to exercise proper stewardship of a pub-
licly quoted company."65
The Disqualification Act is enforced by the British Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI), which receives referrals from receivers in
insolvency proceedings. In 1989 DTI authorized court action in 440 of
the 3,234 disqualification referrals it received. 6 British courts disquali-
fied 303 directors that year, causing some observers to lament that an
increasing number of unfit directors was escaping the public's notice.
Applying the "unfit to be concerned in the management of a com-
pany" standard, British courts have found unfitness in cases in which the
defendant traded consecutively through several insolvent companies that
had failed to pay their corporate tax obligations; 68 in which the defend-
ant traded simultaneously through several insolvent companies, one of
which was undercapitalized from the beginning, and paid himself exces-
sive compensation, rendering the companies unable to pay their corpo-
rate taxes;69 and in which the defendant was the sole director of four
companies, all of which were undercapitalized from the beginning, none
of which filed timely financial reports, and all of which became insolvent
within a five-year period, leaving their corporate taxes unpaid.70 Courts
have disqualified directors whose involvement in a company's failure has
been no more than "peripheral,"71 and even directors who personally lost
substantial funds as a result of the failure.72 Courts considering disquali-
fication orders may review only the conduct that gave rise to the underly-
ing insolvency, and may not consider extrinsic evidence of other business
65. Peter J. Boyer, Maxwell's Silver Hammer, VANITY FAIR, June 1991, at 112, 180.
Maxwell's alleged looting 20 years later of the pension funds at Mirror Group and of corporate
funds at Maxwell Communication, Inc. suggests that the Pergamon disqualification order was
both valid and prescient. See, eg., Nicholas Bray, Securities Lending in UK Dealt Blow by
Maxwell Affair, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1991, at A10.
66. Receivers Act, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 15, 1990, at 27.
67. Roland Gribben, Reforms Fail to Weed out the 'Rogues,' DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Sept. 24, 1990, at 27.
68. In re Lo-Line Elec. Motors Ltd., [1988] I Ch. 477, 491.
69. In re Stanford Servs. Ltd., [1987] BCLC 607, 613.
70. In re Churchill Hotel (Plymouth) Ltd., [1988] BCLC 341. "To reach a finding of
unfitness the court must be satisfied that the director has been guilty of a serious failure or
serious failures, whether deliberately or through incompetence, to perform those duties of a
director which are attendant on the privilege of trading through companies with limited liabil-
ity." 7(2) HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND para. 2114 n.3 (4th ed. Reissue 1988). Miscon-
duct in any capacity other than that of a director may be disregarded. Lo-Line, [1988] I Ch. at
485.
71. In re Majestic Recording Studios Ltd., [1989] BCLC 1, 5-6.
72. In re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd., [1991] Ch. 164, 179-80.
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misconduct.73
The problem with using these cases as a model to determine sub-
stantial unfitness under the Remedies Act is that the Disqualification Act
is triggered by corporate insolvency, not by managerial misconduct that
may fall short of business failure, and is largely a feature of British na-
tional revenue policy rather than of any policy relating to the protection
of investors. That is, the Disqualification Act exists primarily to deter
corporate managers from failing to honor their tax obligations to the
Crown, not to deter them from failing to make required financial disclo-
sures to investors under the applicable securities laws. This singular fo-
cus of the Disqualification Act and the fact-specific, small-company
context in which most of the recent disqualification cases have been de-
cided severely limit the utility of these cases in construing the substantial-
unfitness standard contained in the Remedies Act.
III. A PRELIMINARY PRESCRIPTION FOR APPLYING THE
SUBSTANTIAL-UNFITNESS PROVISION OF THE REMEDIES
ACT
How, then, should federal courts approach the substantial-unfitness
question? A simple answer is that they should do so with great forbear-
ance. At a minimum, the power to bar someone from significant oppor-
tunities for employment should require proof by clear and convincing
evidence that such a sanction is necessary.74 And even assuming the
73. Id. at 177 (holding that period of disqualification should be based solely upon evidence
submitted in connection with a specific insolvency).
74. See Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (requiring that evidence of
need to suspend broker's license be clear and convincing); Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292,
294 (Fla. 1987) (requiring that evidence of need to revoke teacher's license be clear and con-
vincing). The law has long recognized that assertions of unfitness for employment carry seri-
ous consequences for the subject. For example, such assertions, if false, constitute defamation
per se, excusing the plaintiff from pleading or proving special damages. See Abbott v. United
Venture Capital, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D. Nev. 1988) (holding libelous per se the publi-
cation of allegations, later withdrawn, that a lawyer engaged in multiple securities violations).
In this sense, allegations of unfitness are much like allegations of common-law fraud, which,
because of the stigma they impose on the defendant, must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. E.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276,
285 n.18 (1966). In contrast, the standard of proof on the issue whether the defendant violated
the underlying antifraud statute is only a preponderance of the evidence. See Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-91 (1983) (requiring lower court to apply prepon-
derance-of-the-evidence standard in a private action for violation of Rule lOb-5); Steadman v.
SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981) (requiring proof that investment adviser violated antifraud provi-
sions to meet only the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943) (requiring lower court to apply preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard in SEC injunctive action for violation of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act).
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standard of proof is high, one must also consider what sorts of evidence
might be probative on the issue of substantial unfitness to serve.
A. What Conduct Should Be Considered?
An initial question is whether the "conduct" of the defendant that
the court must review to reach its determination on the substantial-unfit-
ness question should be limited to that shown by the SEC in connection
with the underlying securities law violation, or whether that conduct
may also encompass other activities preceding and postdating the viola-
tion. This question-whether the court in the "remedies phase" of the
trial should consider evidence extrinsic to that adduced in the "merits
phase"-is familiar to criminal defense lawyers. In the sentencing phase
of criminal cases, prosecutors often present extrinsic evidence of "other
crimes" and the defendant may challenge that evidence in a so-called
Fatico hearing,75 as occurred, for example, in Michael Milken's case
before Judge Kimba Wood in October 1990.76
1. Extrinsic Evidence of Misconduct
The SEC undoubtedly will argue that extrinsic evidence is fair game
for the court in determining whether a defendant is substantially unfit to
serve as an officer or director of a public company. After all, a primary
purpose of the Remedies Act is to create new enforcement options for
dealing with repeat violators of the securities laws." If the court were
limited to the evidence submitted in support of the government's case in
chief, only those defendants found to have participated in a single "egre-
gious" fraud would be subject to a suspension or bar order,78 while recid-
ivists who engage in sequential, smaller frauds would remain free to
abuse their management positions again and again.
There is, however, another way to view the issue whether a court
should consider extrinsic evidence in addressing the substantial-unfitness
75. See United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711-14 (2d Cir. 1978).
76. Kurt Eichenwald, Final Chapter in Milken Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1990, at DI,
D6.
77. See infra text accompanying note 115.
78. "For example, a corporate officer who perpetrates a financial fraud on the scale of the
Equity Funding case, having been brought to justice, should not be permitted to regain a posi-
tion of corporate control." Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 30 (statement of Richard C.
Breeden). Equity Funding involved a decade-long two-billion dollar insurance fraud scheme in
which corporate employees falsified thousands of records in order to create the appearance of a
successful enterprise; the ultimate loss to investors was estimated at tens of millions of dollars.
See RAYMOND L. DIRKS & LEONARD GROSS, THE GREAT WALL STREET SCANDAL 11
(1974); RONALD L. SOBLE & ROBERT E. DALLOS, THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: THE EQUITY
FUNDING STORY 278 (1975).
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question. The justification for admitting extrinsic evidence during the
sentencing phase of a criminal case is that a court's responsibility for
sentencing historically has implicated broader considerations than those
applicable to the finding of guilt or innocence.79 These considerations
include a societal interest in retribution and deterrence. Courts also have
recognized a need to individualize sentences-to tailor them to the de-
fendant as well as to the crime-and this view often has been cited to
justify relaxing the rules of evidence and permitting broad-ranging in-
quiry into every aspect of the defendant's life."0 These considerations
need not apply in civil cases and, indeed, may be entirely inappropriate,
given that the purpose of sentencing is to impose punishment and punish-
ment is constitutionally impermissible in civil proceedings.81
This latter view, however persuasive, is unlikely to prevail. Given
the policies underlying the Remedies Act, courts are likely to adopt the
government's view and liberally entertain extrinsic evidence of wrongdo-
ing in the remedies phase of the trial.8 2 This is not inappropriate because
(1) the information is relevant to the inquiry at hand-that is, whether
the defendant has "a propensity to abuse a position of corporate trust,"
83
and (2) the suspension-or-bar power is available only in SEC enforce-
ment proceedings and not in private damages actions.84 Thus, the pub-
lic-interest considerations relevant to the entry of a suspension or bar
order are similar to those attendant to the imposition of a criminal sen-
tence,8 5 and warrant a broad inquiry into the defendant's overall
behavior.
79. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("A sentencing judge, however, is
not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional
limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been
determined.").
80. Id.
81. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963); see also Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (stating that injunctive relief is "designed to deter, not to
punish").
82. See, e.g., SEC v. Thomasson Panhandle Co., 145 F.2d 408, 411 (10th Cir. 1944) (ap-
proving admission of evidence of scheme post-dating allegations in underlying cause of action
"for the purpose of proving the allegation of the complaint that the defendant[ ] would con-
tinue to engage in the acts and practices set forth in the complaint"); SEC v. Everest Manage-
ment Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (considering defendant's conduct in an
entirely unrelated matter, "insofar as it reflect[ed] [the defendant's] pronounced tendency to
operate outside the recognized bounds of his profession and the law").
83. Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 30 (statement of Richard C. Breeden).
84. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77t (Law. Co-op. 1991); id. § 78u-1 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
85. See 1 MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURrrIEs PRACTICE: FEDERAL
& STATE ENFORCEMENT § 5.03 (1991).
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2. Hearsay Allegations
Assuming extrinsic evidence is admissible on the substantial-unfit-
ness question, another, more troublesome, question now arises. In crimi-
nal cases, the court during the sentencing phase may consider not only
extrinsic evidence but also hearsay evidence. 86 Thus, courts have enter-
tained hearsay references to the defendant's prior unindicted crimes, 7
affiliations with organized crime,88 and unsubstantiated acts of mayhem89
as part of the sentencing equation. This practice has been justified on the
grounds that no jury is involved and that the sentencing inquiry is not a
"fact finding" inquiry but a predictive one, thus permitting a more flexi-
ble application of the rules of evidence.
The practice of considering hearsay evidence, however, should not
extend to cases in which the SEC seeks entry of a Remedies Act order,
for two reasons. First, Congress has not indicated, as it has in the case of
criminal sentencing,9" its approval of such a practice. Second, civil en-
forcement actions seldom will require the court to consider anonymous
allegations by government informants, as may occur in criminal cases.
Federal courts hearing cases brought under the Remedies Act should not
be permitted to consider hearsay testimony-on the issue of substantial
unfitness or otherwise-except as the Federal Rules of Evidence ex-
pressly, and narrowly, permit.9"
3. The Range of Wrongs to Be Considered
Assuming the court entertains evidence of managerial misconduct
86. Not all of the strict procedural safeguards and evidentiary limitations of a criminal
trial are required at sentencing. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 250 (1949). A trial
judge making a sentencing determination may "appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in
scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source
from which it may come." United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972).
87. E.g., United States v. Bonnet, 769 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding district
court's consideration of presentence report, which included allegation that defendant had been
involved in a scheme to exchange stolen cars for narcotics, even though government conceded
it had no witnesses who could testify to this).
88. United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.) (upholding district court's
consideration of testimony of government witnesses who recounted allegations by six confiden-
tial informants that defendant "was associated with a known crime family figure as a trusted
associate and collector for him"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985).
89. E.g., United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding district
court's consideration of hearsay testimony that defendant was drug organization's chief "en-
forcer" and contract killer).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information concern-
ing the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court
of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.").
91. See FED. R. EvID. 801-06.
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other than that involved in the underlying violation of the securities laws,
excluding hearsay, yet a third question arises: Should that evidence be
limited to proof of financial misconduct, or may it include evidence of
other forms of managerial misconduct, such as violations of the equal
employment laws or environmental regulations? What conduct is rele-
vant to determining whether an executive is substantially unfit to serve?
It is conceivable that, in enacting the Remedies Act, Congress intended
to encourage judicial examination of all aspects of an executive's work,
including competence, diligence, and command of market share, in addi-
tion to previous violations of the securities laws. It seems unlikely, but
the legislative history is silent on this issue. A more reasonable interpre-
tation of the statutory language, given its context, would limit the field of
inquiry to other violations of the federal securities laws, violations of re-
lated state securities laws, and what may loosely be described as "mana-
gerial misconduct," including breaches of fiduciary duties to investors
and creditors.
B. The Enforcement Injunction Versus the Remedies Act Order
Long before the enactment of the Remedies Act, federal courts hear-
ing SEC enforcement actions often entered orders against defendants
found to have violated the securities laws, requiring them to disgorge
their ill-gotten profits92 and enjoining them from engaging in specific fu-
ture misconduct.93 The test for entering this second, "obey the law" type
of injunction is whether, under all the circumstances, "there is a reason-
able likelihood that the wrong will be repeated."94
The Remedies Act in no way impairs courts' authority to continue
to enter these sorts of enforcement injunctions, when the "likelihood of
92. E.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201-02 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985); SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 626-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
93. E.g., Materia, 745 F.2d at 201 (enjoining defendant from insider trading); SEC v.
Champion Sports Management, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 527, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (enjoining de-
fendant from future violations of Rule lOb-5); SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513, 1536
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Cayman Islands Reins. Corp., 734 F.2d 118,
119 (2d Cir. 1984); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 518 F. Supp. 773, 778
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enjoining defendant from violating registration provisions of the 1933 Act).
94. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); see also SEC v.
Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he test for injunctive relief is 'whether
the defendant's past conduct indicates ... that there is a reasonable likelihood of further
violation in the future.' "). Recently, some courts have become quite stringent in the level of
proof they require to support entry of an injunction. See, e.g., SEC v. John Adams Trust
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Mass. 1988) (SEC must present "positive proof of a realistic
likelihood that past wrongdoing will recur" and also demonstrate that recurrent violations are
a "relatively imminent threat" (citing SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir.
1977)); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
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recurrence" standard is met.95 Rather, the Remedies Act has given fed-
eral courts a new remedy, but it has conditioned that remedy on a show-
ing ("substantial unfitness") above and beyond the lesser standard
("likelihood of recurrence") that is required to support an enforcement
injunction. It is therefore important to emphasize that a defendant who
may legitimately be subject to an injunction against specific forms of mis-
conduct is not necessarily subject to a suspension or bar order under the
Remedies Act. That is, it may be appropriate for a court to enjoin spe-
cific future acts, or even to enter a corporation-specific suspension or bar
order,9 6 but it may be inappropriate on the same set of facts to conclude
that the defendant is substantially unfit to serve as an executive of any
public company. Consider the following example.
The SEC recently alleged that, during 1986 and 1987, the chief fi-
nancial officer, chief accounting officer, chief operating officer, and chair-
man of the board of Thortec International, Inc. doctored the company's
financial statements so as to overstate revenue by $8.4 million.97 These
allegations are similar to those made in one of the SEC's first "test cases"
under the Remedies Act.98 In settling the Thortec charges, the defend-
ants consented to an injunction prohibiting them from engaging in future
violations of specified securities laws in any setting.99 In similar cases,
defendants have agreed to injunctions prohibiting them from serving as
officers or directors of the specific companies in which their misconduct
occurred."°° Some have even consented to comprehensive orders en-
95. See H.R. REP. No. 616, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1395. "The Committee emphasizes that specifying this particular type of
ancillary relief in the legislation should not be construed as restricting the authority of the
federal courts to impose any form of equitable relief for a violation of the securities laws." Id.
"By specifying this particular type of ancillary relief, the section does not restrict the court's
inherent equitable authority." Id. at 31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1398.
96. See Barnard, supra note 4, at 51-53.
97. Ex-Engineering Execs Settle Charges They Overstated Firm's Revenues, Income, 22
See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 849, 849 (June 1, 1990).
98. See David Sterns, Litig. Release No. 12,802, 1991 SEC LEXIS 502, at *1-3, 1991 WL
296465 (S.E.C.) at *2-4 (Mar. 11, 1991).
99. Richard H. Towle, Litig. Release No. 12,484, [1987-1991 Accounting & Auditing En-
forcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,727, at 63,289, 63,289,
63,290 (May 24, 1990) (defendants agreed not to aid or abet violations of § 13 of the Exchange
Act, and one defendant, the corporate chief financial officer, agreed not to violate § 17(a)(2) or
§ 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act).
100. E.g., Florafax Int'l, Inc., Litig. Release No. 10,617, [1987-1991 Accounting & Audit-
ing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,444, at 63,161,
63,162-63 (Nov. 27, 1984) (CEO agreed to resign and refrain from serving for three years);
American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., Litig. Release No. 8561, 1978 SEC LEXIS 557, at * 1,
1978 WL 19925 (S.E.C.) at *1-2 (Oct. 11, 1978) (defendant, CEO and director, agreed to
resign and refrain from serving as officer or director); Penn Cent., Litig. Release No. 8378,
1978 SEC LEXIS 1723, at *1, 1978 WL 20740 (S.E.C.) at *1 (Apr. 21, 1978) (defendant
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joining them from serving as an officer or director of any public
company.
101
Assuming the Thortec defendants had litigated, rather than settled,
the SEC's complaint, it is entirely possible that a federal judge hearing
the case would have entered an enforcement injunction identical to that
agreed to in settlement. This remedy would permit the defendants, on
pain of contempt were they to violate the injunction's terms, to continue
working in their existing environment or elsewhere.
Alternatively, the court could have entered a corporation-specific in-
junction, forcing the defendants to leave the scene of their prior miscon-
duct either temporarily or permanently,"0 2 but leaving them free to seek
work as executives in those public companies willing to hire and super-
vise them.10 3 In any event, the full force of the Remedies Act "death
penalty" provision, foreclosing the defendant's most restorative job op-
portunities, might not be required to achieve the Act's stated objective of
investor protection.
In pre-Remedies Act cases, federal courts were admonished to tailor
each injunction so as to "restrain no more than what is reasonably re-
quired to accomplish its ends."" This same sense of restraint-and a
rule of thumb counseling courts to apply the least invasive remedy possi-
agreed not to become a director, officer, employee, or consultant to any of the Penn Central
"complex of companies," presumably for life).
101. Charles W. Anshen, Litig. Release No. 11,618, 1987 SEC LEXIs 3094, at *1, 1987
WL 110215 (S.E.C.) at *1-2 (Dec. 2, 1987) (barring defendant from serving as an officer or
director of a public company for five years); Wallace C. Sparkman, Litig. Release No. 11,532,
1987 SEC LEXIS 3795, at *2, 1987 WL 113537 (S.E.C.) at *2 (Sept. 3, 1987) (barring defend-
ant from serving as either a director or an officer of a public company for four years); Gulf
Resources, Inc., Litig. Release 10,291, 1984 SEC LEXIS 2168, at *1, 1984 WL 50519 (S.E.C)
at *1-2 (Feb. 21, 1984) (prohibiting one defendant from becoming or acting as an officer, direc-
tor, or control person of any public company absent Commission permission); Frederix P.
DeVeau, Litig. Release No. 9842, 1982 SEC LEXIS 106, at *1, 1982 WL 34335 (S.E.C.) at *1-
2 (Dec. 17, 1982) (barring defendant from associating as an officer, director, control person, or
consultant to any public companies until he satisfies a disgorgement order and therafter only
upon notice to the Commission); Jack M. Catain, Jr., Litig. Release No. 9129, 1980 SEC
LEXIS 1123, at *3, 1980 WL 21849 (S.E.C.) at *3 (July 8, 1980) (barring defendant from
serving as an officer or director of a public company absent court approval); Sheldon L. Hart,
Litig, Release No. 9080, 1980 SEC LEXIS 1526, at *1, 1980 WL 26886 (S.E.C.) at *1-2 (May
9, 1980) (barring defendant from being a director or, under certain circumstances, an officer of
a public company unless that company has and maintains an audit committee of the board).
102. Such an order would be proper as a form of ancillary relief. SEC v. Techni-Culture,
Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,501, at 95,758, 95,759 (Apr. 2,
1974).
103. Remember that under the proxy rules shareholders also would be entitled to know
about the existence of the injunction, thus raising the likelihood that the defendants' conduct
would be closely monitored. See supra note 40.
104. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir.) ("[T]he
nature and extent of the relief granted should not exceed that necessary to adequately protect
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ble-should extend to consideration of executive suspension or bar or-
ders under the Remedies Act. Given the alternative remedies already
available, federal courts should turn to this extraordinary form of relief
only as a last resort.
This is not to say that hard-core securities-law violators should be
immune from imposition of a Remedies Act order. I merely urge caution
against the too-easy application of the Act's powerful disqualification
provision, especially since this type of sanction inherently invites
overuse. 1
0 5
C. The Substance of the Inquiry
Bearing in mind the limits on the scope of inquiry discussed
above,106 a federal court should consider seven issues before it can feel
confident in making a finding of substantial unfitness. As a threshold
question, the court should ask whether the defendant's conduct was
either "egregious" or "chronic," because these are the only two circum-
stances under which Congress anticipated the Remedies Act order would
be available.
1. The "Egregiousness" of the Underlying Violation
In lobbying for the Remedies Act, both SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden and his predecessor, David Ruder, assured Congress that the
Commission would seek executive suspension and bar orders only in
cases of "egregious" misconduct or of repeated violations of the securi-
ties laws. 107 Inevitably, however, the SEC and defendants will differ
about what conduct qualifies as "egregious." Thus, federal courts may
have to adopt at least informal guidelines to determine whether the SEC
has satisfied this necessary precondition-a showing of misconduct be-
yond mere liability-for initiating the substantial-unfitness inquiry. This
is not an unfamiliar process. In deciding whether to enter enforcement
injunctions in pre-Remedies Act cases, courts often looked to the magni-
the public interest."), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1971); SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp. 635, 650
(N.D.N.Y. 1979).
105. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
106. See supra part III.A.2.
107. Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 29-30 (statement of Richard C. Breeden); Hearings
on a Bill to Amend Federal Securities Laws in Order to Provide Additional Enforcement Reme-
dies for Violation of these Laws: H.R. 975 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1989) (state-
ment of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the SEC); Hearings on the Recommendations of the
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 174
(1988) (statement of David S. Ruder).
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tude of the underlying securities law violations.108 Another analogy fa-
miliar to federal courts is the process of determining whether a
defendant's conduct, in addition to supporting a finding of liability, has
been sufficiently willful and wanton to support a judgment for punitive
damages. 109
Some indicia of "egregiousness" are predictable. In considering
whether a defendant is substantially unfit to serve, district courts should
ask with respect to the SEC'S case-in-chief these eight questions: Was the
loss to investors actual, or only hypothetical? 10 What was the amount
of investors' losses, both in the aggregate and per investor? How many
investors suffered losses? Did the defendant act alone or did she enlist
the participation of other, less culpable actors? Did the violation occur
within the confines of one enterprise, or involve several? Was the defend-
ant's infraction an isolated action or part of a comprehensive and long-
lasting scheme? What was the duration of the scheme? Finally, did the
violation generate public attention (that is, was it regarded as news-
worthy)? A showing under these guidelines that the defendant's actions
resulted in substantial harm, both to individual victims and to the securi-
ties markets generally, could fairly bring about a finding that her conduct
was "egregious." Only then should the court proceed to consider the
defendant's fitness to serve as a corporate executive in the future.
In considering the egregiousness issue, federal courts could, but
need not, refer to the formulas set forth in the federal sentencing guide-
lines for determining the "offense level" of similar behavior in a criminal
context. The sentencing guidelines categorize fraud-related crimes based
on such factors as the defendant's premeditation and the amount lost by
defrauded complainants, 11 and then permit upward or downward ad-
justment based on the defendant's degree of leadership in the fraud,.. 2
the nature of the victim(s), 1 3 and the defendant's acceptance of responsi-
108. See, e.g., SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53-54 (7th Cir. 1972)
("These were not mere 'technical' violations of regulatory legislation, but continual and exten-
sive violations of provisions which lie at the very heart of a remedial statute.").
109. JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE
§ 5.03 (1985).
110. There can be a startling difference between estimated investor losses and "proven"
losses. See, e.g., DENNIS LEVINE, INSIDE OUT: AN INSIDER'S AccouNT OF WALL STREET
416-17 (1991) (noting that while prosecutors argued that Michael Milken's crimes had cost the
investing public $4-7 million, the trial judge ruled that the total investor loss was $318,082).
111. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL MANuAL-1992 EDITION § 2F1.1 (1991).
112. Id. § 3B1.1 (permitting upward adjustment when defendant was the manager, orga-
nizer, supervisor, or leader of the scheme).
113. Id. § 3Al.I (providing for upward adjustment when the defendant's victim(s) can be
characterized as "vulnerable"); see, e.g., United States v. Benskin, 926 F.2d 562, 565-66 (6th
Cir. 1991) (subjecting defendant broker who defrauded investors of over $3.8 million to 100%
1992] 1511
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
bility for the offense."1 Calculating a hypothetical offense level under
the guidelines could serve as a benchmark in assessing the propriety of
entering a Remedies Act order. A preferable and less formulaic course
would require the court to consider "egregiousness" using the mosaic
process described above.
2. The Defendant's "Repeat Offender" Status
An alternative threshold inquiry, when "egregiousness" may not be
present, is whether the defendant is a repeat, or "chronic," securities-law
violator. In pre-Remedies Act cases many decisions turned on this issue,
and the legislative history of the Act suggests it may be a critical factor in
Remedies Act cases as well.
115
In the pre-Remedies Act cases, courts asked whether a defendant's
violation of the law was "isolated" or "recurrent." '116 Believing that a
person who violates the law repeatedly is likely to continue to do so,
117
courts used evidence of repeat offenses to justify the entry of enforcement
injunctions. 1 Thus, in cases in which there was no evidence of similar
misconduct either before or after the violation, courts often found injunc-
tive relief inappropriate. 9 When, on the other hand, misconduct had
occurred repeatedly over a several-year period, courts were more inclined
to enter enforcement injunctions.120 The consensus in these cases seemed
to be that when a defendant's violations of the securities laws were
"'part of a chronic pattern of violations,' "1121 an injunction might be the
only appropriate noncriminal response. These same guidelines should
apply in cases in which a Remedies Act order is under consideration,
upward adjustment because of the "extent and magnitude of the harm" he caused, especially to
his elderly and disabled clients). See generally C. Edward Fletcher III, Sophisticated Investors
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1085-88 (noting disparate judicial
treatment of defendants in civil cases involving sophisticated investors compared to cases in-
volving unsophisticated investors).
114. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 111, § 3El.1(a) (permitting downward adjust-
ment when defendant "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of per-
sonal responsibility for his criminal conduct").
115. See S. REP. No. 337, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1990) ("A permanent bar might be
appropriate if the violation were particularly egregious or the violator was a recidivist.").
116. SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 834 (1977).
117. See infra text accompanying note 151.
118. Traditionally, recidivism "weigh[ed] heavily in favor of [an] injunction." SEC v.
Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1980).
119. E.g., SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979).
120. See Bonastia, 614 F.2d at 913.
121. SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 79 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting SEC v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,583, at 94,472 (D.D.C.
Oct. 28, 1978)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980).
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with the understanding that demonstrated recidivism is merely a thresh-
old question and that the SEC must establish other factors discussed be-
low, to warrant the imposition of a remedy as drastic as an executive
suspension or bar.
3. The Role of the Defendant in the Scheme to Defraud
The Remedies Act limits courts' authority to enter an executive sus-
pension or bar order to violations of the antifraud statutes, section
17(a)(1) of the Securities Act or section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 22
These provisions encompass a wide range of behavior, from insider trad-
ing by corporate executives 123 to churning by brokers124 to aiding and
abetting fraud on investors by accountants, lawyers, and others. 12 Con-
sequently, the first post-threshold question federal courts should consider
when presented with a substantial-unfitness inquiry is whether the de-
fendant's unlawful conduct occurred while he was acting as an officer or
director of a public company or whether he was acting in some nonex-
ecutive capacity.12 6 The answer to this question should prove significant,
122. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77t(e) (Law. Co-op. 1991); id. § 78u(d)(2) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1991).
123. E.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 441-42 (9th Cir. 1990) (corporate president secretly
bought stock of acquisition target before takeover announcement).
124. E-g., Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 906 F.2d 1206, 1210 & n.3 (8th
Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment for $100,000 plus $2 million in punitive damages against de-
fendant broker who had churned account by making over 100 unauthorized trades); Nesbit v.
McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding violation by defendant broker who had
liquidated some of plaintiff's portfolio and engaged in speculative trading, even though the
portfolio increased in value).
125. E.g., Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1012 (1lth Cir. 1985) (holding liable as
aider and abettor a bank that prepared a comfort letter to bond trustee urging disbursement of
funds to its client without adequate investigation); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,
183-84 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding accounting firm liable as aider and abettor under rule lOb-5
because one of its partners wrote a misleading tax opinion letter), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938
(1982); SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 65 (D. Conn. 1988) (holding
liable as aider and abettor a lawyer who participated in a scheme to extend a public offering
beyond its specified deadline and took no steps to amend the prospectus when the company's
CEO was indicted for mail fraud), aff'd sub nor. SEC v. Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3228 (1990).
126. The legislative history of the Remedies Act confirms the importance of this inquiry:
The Committee believes that the remedy of a bar or suspension from service as a
corporate officer or director is especially appropriate in cases in which a defendant
has engaged in fraudulent conduct while serving in a corporate or other fiduciary
capacity. Although the express authority to grant this relief is not limited to cases
involving corporate officers or directors, the legislation would authorize the remedy
only when the conduct of the defendant demonstrates the defendant's substantial
unfitness to serve as an officer or director.
H.R. REP. No. 616, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1394.
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though not dispositive, in determining whether a Remedies Act order is
appropriate.
Defendants whose role in the underlying antifraud violation had
nothing to do with executive status should benefit from a rebuttable pre-
sumption that they are not appropriate subjects for a suspension or bar
order; those whose executive status facilitated their misconduct should
be burdened by a presumption that they are at least eligible for such an
order, assuming other factors, discussed below, are present. Given these
presumptions, the psychiatrist caught trading on inside information re-
vealed to him by a patient,127 for example, or the chief executive's wife
who transmits confidential market information to a relative,1 28 would not
be candidates for a Remedies Act order. By contrast, a chief executive
who masterminds an elaborate scheme to defraud investors, resulting in
millions of dollars in losses; 129 one who engages in "massive financial
fraud" over several years, sells his shares before detection, and then flees
the country;1 30 or one With a criminal record for fraud who then partici-
pates in misappropriating the proceeds of a public offering1 3 1 would seem
to be precisely the sort of person for whom the harshest provisions of the
Remedies Act were intended.
It is, of course, possible that the SEC could overcome a defendant's
presumption of ineligibility-in other words, that nonexecutive behavior
could form the basis for a Remedies Act order. For example, a lawyer
serving as outside counsel who is repeatedly implicated in fraudulent se-
curities schemes involving his corporate clients,1 32 an investment banker
who masterminds a particularly rapacious insider-trading scheme, 133 or
an auditor who knowingly and deliberately misrepresents corporate
127. See Insider Trading Psychiatrist Pleads Guilty to Securities Fraud, 22 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 996, 996 (July 6, 1990).
128. See Genentech's President's Wife Settles SEC Charges She Tipped Brother, 22 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1624, 1624-25 (Nov. 23, 1990).
129. See, e.g., DANIEL AKsT, WONDER Boy: BARRY MINKOW-THE KID WHO SWIN-
DLED WALL STREET 4-6 (1990) (investors, banks, and creditors lost at least $100 million
where company's alleged service business was virtually nonexistent).
130. See, eg., Eddie Antar, Litig. Release No. 12,548, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 95,341, at 96,655, 96,655-56 (July 18, 1990) (judgment entered in absentia
against CEO for $73.5 million).
131. See SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513, 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd sub nom. SEC v.
Cayman Islands Reins. Corp., 734 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1984).
132. E.g., SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 65 (D. Conn. 1988) (law-
yer-defendant performed several unlawful acts in connection with client's public offering),
aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3228 (1990).
133. See DOUGLAS FRANTZ, LEVINE & CO.: WALL STREET'S INSIDER TRADING SCAN-
DAL 11 (1987) (investment banker made $11.6 million in net profits by trading on information
secured from his own clients, as well as information purchased from his friends); LEVINE,
supra note 110, at 17 (Levine contending his net profits were $10.6 million).
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value in order to facilitate a significant fraud on investors'34 might quite
reasonably be subject to disqualification from serving as an officer or di-
rector of a public company as well as to other civil and criminal sanc-
tions. It generally will be more appropriate, however, for professional
misconduct to be addressed through a carefully drawn injunction and the
professional disciplinary process than through entry of a Remedies Act
order.135 Defendants who have never served as public company officers
or directors, or whose misconduct is wholly unrelated to their executive
status, should only rarely be candidates for an executive suspension or
bar.
4. The Defendant's Degree of Scienter
In deciding whether to enter an injunction in pre-Remedies Act
cases, courts routinely looked to the defendant's "degree of scienter,"' 36
both in connection with the immediate violation and in connection with
extrinsic misconduct. 37  Not surprisingly, in these cases courts were
more likely to enjoin defendants if their violations of the securities laws
were intentional than if their conduct was merely reckless or grossly neg-
ligent. 138 Similarly, in criminal cases courts have cited the presence of
premeditation and the defendant's leadership role in the crime-both of
which are indicators of scienter-as appropriate elements in determining
punishment.
139
Under the Remedies Act, a court cannot enter a suspension or bar
order absent a finding of scienter.'1 To warrant this finding, a defend-
ant's conduct may be intentional but, at a minimum, it must be
134. See, e.g., $80 Million Settlement by E.S.M. Auditor Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1987,
§ 1, at 37 (reporting that audit partner accepted bribes to certify false financial statements of
E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc. in a scheme that cost investors $320 million; he was later
sentenced to 12 years in prison).
135. Professionals who also serve as corporate officers or directors may be subject to sanc-
tions in both capacities. See, e.g., Saul Bluestone, Litig. Release No. 12,589, [1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) % 95,423, at 97,138, 97,139 (Aug. 22, 1990) (SEC alleging
that lawyer traded on inside information acquired while serving on a corporate board); In re
Reich, 128 A.D.2d 329, 331, 515 N.Y.S.2d 775, 777 (1987) (striking lawyer from the roll of
attorneys after being convicted of insider trading).
136. SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 834 (1977).
137. See, eg., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980) ("An important factor in [the deci-
sion to enjoin future conduct] is the degree of intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's
past conduct.").
138. See, e.g., SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1980).
139. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
140. Scienter is a necessary element of claims under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, see Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976), and of claims under § 17(a)(1) of the Securi-
ties Act, see Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697.
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"highly unreasonable, involving not merely simple, or even in-
excusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defend-
ant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of
it."
1 4 1
A court considering whether to enter a Remedies Act order may
wish to take note whether the defendant's misconduct was clearly inten-
tional-as in the case of the CEO who traded on inside information
through accounts created for that purpose in his wife's maiden name,
142
or the broker who defrauded his customers by sending them falsified
profit statements while secretly pocketing their money143-or merely the
consequence of mismanagement. 1" Positioning the defendant some-
where on the scienter continuum helps the court to focus on the funda-
mental question posed by the substantial-unfitness standard: whether the
defendant is likely to continue to engage in fraudulent conduct regardless
of where she is employed.14 1 Courts in other contexts have frequently
cited incidents of blatant, intentional fraud as especially significant
predictors of future unlawful behavior.'
46
A subissue may arise in the scienter inquiry: whether the defendant
deliberately flouted regulatory warnings that his conduct was unlaw-
ful.147 Cases in which the defendant was made expressly aware of the
illegality of his actions, but continued them, may present particularly
strong arguments for entry of a Remedies Act order. In any event, the
141. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.) (quoting
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Olda. 1976)), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
142. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 441-42 (9th Cir. 1990).
143. See United States v. Benskin, 926 F.2d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1991).
144. See, e'g., FDIC v. First Interstate Bank, 885 F.2d 423, 432 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding
bank liable as an aider and abettor to customer's fraud where bank had ample evidence cus-
tomer was dealing in stolen property, and many bank employees had urged terminating the
customer's accounts but were overruled by bank executives).
145. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
146. Cf SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp. 635, 649 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that "fraudulent
conduct in the past will give rise to an inference of continued future violations"); SEC v. J&B
Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974) (same); In re Application of K.B., 291
Md. 170, 178, 434 A.2d 541, 545 (1981) (" '[Tihere can be no doubt ... that thievery of a
repetitive nature, as here, is usually indicative of a serious character flaw.' ") (quoting In re
Application of David H., 283 Md. 632, 640-41, 392 A.2d 83, 88 (1978)).
147. See, e.g., SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 78 (D.C. Cir.) ("Ignoring warn-
ings of possible violations is relevant [to the question] whether to grant an injunction."), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1969) (uphold-
ing injunction when, following notification by the SEC that their unregistered offering was
unlawful, defendants proceeded to make an additional, similar offering), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
972 (1970).
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court should give careful consideration to the question of the defendant's
state of mind.
5. The Defendant's Economic Stake in the Violation
The proceeds question-whether the defendant personally profited
from her violation of the securities law-is another appropriate consider-
ation in evaluating the propriety of an executive suspension or bar order
under the Remedies Act. 4 ' Some securities-law violators, such as tip-
pers who do not trade, 49 receive no cash benefits from their misconduct
while others, such as those who misappropriate the proceeds of a securi-
ties offering or loot a corporation's treasury, 50 certainly do. Lack of an
economic stake need not insulate defendants from entry of a Remedies
Act order, but the presence of an economic stake in a scheme to defraud
investors should serve as an aggravating factor tending to favor such an
order.
6. The Likelihood That Misconduct Will Recur
At the core of any inquiry into whether a defendant is substantially
unfit to serve as a corporate officer or director is the question whether he
is likely to continue to engage in fraudulent conduct. Repeated prior
misconduct may be one--indeed the best-predictor of later fraudulent
behavior.1 5' The more interesting question arises when the defendant
has no track record of abuse of his corporate position but is a first-time,
albeit "egregious," offender. Criminologists who have studied recidivism
among white collar offenders have some, though as yet not much, intelli-
gence to offer on this question.
Contrary to widely held assumptions that white collar offenders sel-
dom recidivate, recent studies show that many of them.have a history of
unlawful conduct. For example, among a sample of defendants con-
victed of securities fraud, 27.6% had prior criminal convictions, 5 2 and
148. See e.g., SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 69 (D. Conn. 1988)
(noting in support of an enforcement injunction that the attorney-defendant had received a
$15,000 fee traceable directly to his violation of the securities law), aff'd sub nom. SEC v.
Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (1989), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 3228 (1990).
149. See, eg., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237
(2d Cir. 1974) (holding nontrading tippers liable under rule lOb-5).
150. See, ag., SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513, 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that defend-
ants had, without disclosure, used proceeds of stock offering to finance real estate venture and
interest in speculative new issues), aff'd sub nor. SEC v. Cayman Islands Reins. Corp., 734
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1984).
151. See infra notes 152-55, 159 and accompanying text.
152. Stanton Wheeler et al., White Collar Crimes and Criminals, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
331, 345 (1988).
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4% had previously been sentenced to jail. 15 3 Among the same sample
population, 32% had a prior arrest record and 11% had two or more
prior arrests.
15 4
Of course, looking to recidivists' criminal histories and finding pat-
terns of misconduct retrospectively does not permit one to make predic-
tions of future misconduct from current unlawful behavior. We do
know, however, that "evidence of criminal careers can be found even
within a highly restricted population of elite white-collar offenders."15 5
How one identifies the potential for "career" criminality and measures
that potential for a given defendant is precisely the problem that the
Remedies Act presents.
Some theorists suggest that people who violate the securities laws
are little different from street criminals-they are "relatively unable or
unwilling to delay gratification; they are relatively indifferent to punish-
ment and to the interests of others." '156 In more concrete terms, "[tihe
securities-fraud offender should have been a youthful mugger but missed
the boat." '15 7 Nevertheless, there is a significant distinction between the
demographic characteristics and the recidivism rates of securities law vi-
olators and those of street-crime offenders. 158 The demographic distinc-
tions may be attributable in part to the fact that a securities law violator
by definition requires higher educational attainment and a higher-status
employment position to effectuate her crime than a street thug requires
to grab a victim's purse. The reason securities law violators have a lower
recidivism rate may be that securities law violations typically depend on
153. David Weisburd et al., White-Collar Crime and Criminal Careers: Some Preliminary
Findings, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 342, 346 (1990). Other white collar crimes correlated even
more closely with prior criminal activity. For example, among tax offenders, 43.2% had a
prior criminal record, Wheeler et al., supra note 152, at 345, and 14% had done jail time,
Weisburd et al., supra, at 346.
154. Weisburd et al., supra note 153, at 346. In a separate study of individuals whom the
SEC investigated for securities law violations, at least half had been investigated on one or
more previous occasions by the SEC, FBI, or other law enforcement agencies, usually for
securities fraud. SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, WAYWARD CAPITALISTS 39 (1984).
155. Weisburd et al., supra note 153, at 347.
156. Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Causes of White Collar Crime, 25 CRIMINOL-
OGY 949, 959-60 (1987).
157. DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITE COLLAR OF-
FENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 187 (1991).
158. For example, securities law violators are far more likely than street crime offenders to
be white, to be employed, and specifically to be employed in a white collar job. The average
age of a securities law violator is 44, considerably older than the typical street crime offender.
Weisburd et al., supra note 153, at 344-45. As for recidivism, securities law violators have a
prior arrest rate of 32%, id., while street crime offenders have a far higher prior arrest rate. A
sample of New York City felony defendants in 1971 revealed that almost 66% had prior arrest
records and 33% had prior felony convictions. Id. at 348 & n.6.
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the creation or exploitation of an organization, and do not lend them-
selves to the sort of unaccompanied, impulsive behavior often character-
istic of street crimes.
In addition to being easily distinguishable from street criminals, se-
curities law violators may be distinguishable from other white collar of-
fenders in ways important for the application of the Remedies Act.
Specifically, securities law violators may be more prone to repeat their
abuses than are other white collar offenders. David Weisburd, a crimi-
nologist at Rutgers University, has been following the careers of several
hundred white collar offenders following their convictions for white col-
lar crimes. His preliminary findings indicate that the securities law viola-
tors in his sample have a higher rate of post-conviction "failures" than
the total sample. I59 These failures, however, may often represent con-
duct quite different from that involved in the original conviction. That
is, those white collar offenders who recidivate often diversify into new
territories of wrongdoing, and their post-conviction conduct may include
offenses unrelated to their earlier crime(s). I6
In short, little is yet known about the likelihood of recidivism
among first-time white collar offenders generally, or securities law viola-
tors specifically.1 61  Experts do concede that white collar misconduct,
like street crime, declines with age. 162 Many also agree that a stigma of
the sort that the Remedies Act imposes, like that resulting from incarcer-
ation, may well encourage future unlawful behavior rather than, as in-
tended, discourage it.
1 63
159. Telephone Interview with David Weisburd, Criminologist, Rutgers University (Sept.
26, 1991).
160. The criminal histories of convicted white collar offenders tend to disprove the notion
that offenders "specialize" in a particular type of crime. In fact, "[o]nly one in five white-
collar offenders with prior records have previously been convicted of a white-collar crime" of
any sort. WEISBURD et al., supra note 157, at 66; see also MICHAEL R. GOTrFREDSON &
TRAViS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 189 (1990) ("[There is little reason to
think that the idea of specialization in white collar offenses will bear fruit."). But see Weisburd
et al., supra note 153, at 349, 352 (suggesting that securities law violators, more than other
white collar criminals, may engage in a relatively high degree of specialization).
161. Telephone Interview with David Weisburd, supra note 159 ("very little is known
about the recidivism of white-collar offenders"); Telephone Interview with Michael Benson,
Criminologist, University of Tennessee (Sept. 27, 1991) ("there isn't much [scholarship] that is
predictive or useful"); see also Terrill R. Holland et al., Comparison and Combination of
Clinical and Statistical Predictions of Recidivism Among Adult Offenders, 68 J. APPLIED
PsYcH. 203, 203 (1983) ("[R]ecidivism has been resistant to highly accurate prediction, despite
numerous and elaborate efforts to accomplish this purpose.").
162. GoTrraEDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 160, at 193 (comparing age distributions for
murder with those for fraud and embezzlement). This does not necessarily mean, however,
that a single career offender slackens off as he grows older.
163. See JOHN BRAITHWArrE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 128, 135 (1989) (ar-
guing that stigmatization may result in defendants' developing a desire to get back at the
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What this means is that federal district courts confronted with an
SEC request for a Remedies Act order will have to do what courts have
always done in similar circumstances: trust their instincts. 1" When
there is no prior record to review, courts will have to "view [the defend-
ant's] whole life history and his place in society." '165 They will have to
assess not only the defendant's fraudulent conduct, but also his motives
in getting caught up in the fraud, his subsequent cooperation with the
government, and the stability of his family support system.166 The pro-
cess is necessarily inexact, but not one foreign to experienced trial judges.
The problem with this process, in addition to its being subject to
individual judicial prejudices, is that it inherently tilts in favor of over-
sanctioning. In his book Occupational Crime, Gary S. Green argues that
selective incapacitation schemes, such as that presented by the Remedies
Act, inevitably result in courts sanctioning defendants for whom incapac-
itation is unnecessary ("false positives") far more often than they fail to
sanction defendants for whom incapacitation is appropriate ("false nega-
tives").167 This simply means that judges must exercise self-restraint in
system or joining, with other outcasts, a subculture of resistance and illegality); see also Toni
M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1934-35
(1991) (arguing that, because of their residential and occupational mobility, middle class de-
fendants often find "shaming" punishments ineffective).
164. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 10 (1988) (describing the sentencing process as one permeated
with the personal values and sentiments of the sentencing judge).
165. Id. at 102 (quoting federal judge on how he determines sentence for a white-collar
offender).
166. Id. at 102-20 (discussing these criteria as employed by judges in determining sentences
and quoting various judges with regard to same).
167. Green states:
Selective occupational disqualification [bars] individuals from certain future occupa-
tional activities on a case-by-case basis. However, selective incapacitation is predi-
cated upon the idea that one can accurately predict which persons need to be
incapacitated. This assumption is often incorrect, and the ramifications of an incor-
rect prediction are substantial. First, there is the person who is predicted to be a
nonrecidivist and is allowed to continue in the same occupational role, who then
commits another occupational crime. This person is known as a "false negative" (the
offender was predicted to be negative on the future criminality trait, but that predic-
tion was false). An error on the other side would involve the person who is predicted
to be an occupational recidivist and is disqualified on that basis, but, had that person
not been disqualified by being allowed to continue in occupation, no new crimes
would have been committed. This situation represents a "false positive" (the person
was predicted to be positive on the future criminality trait, but that prediction was
false). The result of the false negative is an additional offense (or several of them).
The result of the false positive is the infliction of punishment on persons who need
not have received that sanction.
... Because incapacitation is rooted in crime control, there will be a tendency to
concentrate on the avoidance of false negatives when predicting individual recidi-
vism. This emphasis naturally increases the number of false positives, because when
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identifying defendants whom they find "substantially unfit," lest they
oversanction.
7. The Defendant's Appreciation of an Executive's Fiduciary
Obligations
Interwoven among all of the foregoing issues is a fundamental-and
perhaps unanswerable-question: as a result of her experiences, does the
defendant comprehend and has she internalized the necessary notions of
fiduciary obligation and the standards of care within which executives
must operate? In pre-Remedies Act proceedings, courts often framed
this issue as one of contrition.168 There is more, however, to the appreci-
ation issue than the presence of remorse. 69 Defendants must show,
through testimony and practice, that they have affirmatively embraced
the special and demanding role of an officer or director of a public
company.
I do not suggest that, in this context, courts quiz defendants on the
principles of corporate governance or that they send defendants to the
securities law equivalent of drunk drivers' school. I do suggest, however,
that (1) a court satisfy itself that the defendant is at least as worthy of
investor trust and confidence as are corporate executives of other public
the prognosticator is unsure about whether an offender will commit another crime,
recidivism is likely to be overpredicted. In other words, when in doubt, believe the
worst, because underestimating recidivism inflicts more crime. Thus, with selective
occupational disqualification, there will be a natural tendency for false positives to
outnumber false negatives. False positives are particularly likely to increase immedi-
ately after a false negative is discovered (parole boards are more cautious in granting
paroles after one of their releasees has been involved in a serious crime).
GARY S. GREEN, OCCUPATIONAL CRIME 248 (1990).
168. See, eg., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that defendant
"insisted that he had done nothing wrong"); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082,
1101 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendants maintained their conduct was blameless even though the dis-
trict court had found their violations to be "'willful, blatant, and often completely outra-
geous' ") (quoting SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1971));
SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1969) (defendants insisted throughout the
trial that their conduct was lawful and that the offering did not fall within the Act's registra-
tion requirements), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970); SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689
F. Supp. 53, 69 (D. Conn. 1988) (defendant's conduct at trial showed "callous indifference" to
his wrongdoing), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
3228 (1990).
169. White collar criminals often fail to express remorse, instead rationalizing their wrong-
doing with explanations such as "that's the way business is done," "I didn't mean to steal the
money, just to borrow it," or "this wasn't murder, after all." See, e.g., Michael L. Benson,
Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White Collar Crime, 23 CRIMINOL-
OGY 583, 589-98 (1985). White collar criminals as a group generally do not have criminal self-
images. GREEN, supra note 167, at 240; Robert Meier & Gilbert Geis, The Psychology of the
White Collar Offender, in ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 85, 96 (Gilbert Geis ed., 1982).
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companies, and (2) the defendant bear the burden of persuasion on this
ultimate issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Remedies Act-as it was intended to be-is a potent new
weapon for the SEC. Arguing that a defendant is substantially unfit to
serve as an executive in any public company may well assist the Commis-
sion in extracting favorable prelitigation settlements. Sometimes, how-
ever, this leverage will fail, and the issue of executive unfitness will have
to be considered on its merits. The stakes will be high. For many de-
fendants, the imposition of a Remedies Act order may be more burden-
some and life-altering than a typical securities violation prison sentence
would be. 170
In deciding the substantial-unfitness issue, federal courts will be de-
termining who is a suitable candidate for high corporate office and who is
not. One need not agree that the Remedies Act is ill considered to recog-
nize the challenge that federal courts inevitably will face in making that
determination. This Article attempts to assist courts in that process,
while cautioning that simplistic reference to non-Remedies Act jurispru-
dence may lead to inappropriate results.
170. For example, the median prison sentence for defendants convicted of securities fraud
has been calculated to be 12 months. WEISBURD et al., supra note 157, at 131. In contrast, a
Remedies Act order can prevent a person from being a corporate officer or director for life.
See 15 U.S.C.S. § 77t(e) (Law. Co-op. 1991); id § 78u(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
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